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11 Introduction
One of the fundamental steps in the development of general equilibrium theory
was the formulation of objects of choice as contingent consumption claims (Arrow,
1953). Under this formulation, besides being deﬁned by physical properties and
location in space and time, a commodity is also deﬁned by the state of nature
in which it is made available.1 With this extension of the commodity space, the
model of Arrow and Debreu (1954) could cover the case of uncertainty.
But, in a context of uncertainty, agents usually have diﬀerent information.
To cover this more general situation, Radner (1968) introduced asymmetric
information in the general equilibrium model, now known as a diﬀerential
information economy. In this setting, agents have private information that deter-
mines which states of nature they can distinguish.2 The competitive equilibrium
of this model, known as a Walrasian Expectations Equilibrium, is based on the
assumption that agents only make trades contingent on events that they can ob-
serve. As a result, agents consume the same in states of nature that they do not
distinguish.3 In practice, the sole impact of an agent’s private information is this
restriction on the consumption space.
In a recent paper, we suggested that this restriction on the consumption space
should be relaxed. From the fact that an agent does not observe a diﬀerence
between two states should not follow that her consumption should be the same
in these states. It is true that this introduces some diﬃculties. Suppose that an
agent buys the right to receive x1 in state ω1 and x2 in state ω2, but is not able
to distinguish between the two states. If the actual state of nature is ω1 and the
1For example, instead of talking about good A in state 1, or good B in state 2, we should
talk about good A1 or good B2.
2With a ﬁnite number of states, the private information of an agent is modeled as a partition
such that the agent can distinguish states that belong to diﬀerent sets of the partition.
3For this to be true, it is also assumed that agents observe their endowments, that is, each
agent has the same initial endowments in states of nature that she cannot distinguish.
2bundle x2 is delivered, the agent has to accept this, since she is ignorant about
which is the actual state of nature. What the agent actually bought was the
right to receive x1 or x2 if one of the states ω1 or ω2 occurs. We designated these
uncertain bundles as lists.
What we have found, essentially, is that even if the agent expects to receive the
worst bundle among the alternatives, she is better oﬀ buying the right to receive
diﬀerent bundles for delivery in states of nature that she does not distinguish,
that is, buying lists. Under this assumption of extreme pessimism, the solution,
which we designated as a prudent expectations equilibrium, is characterized by the
fact that the agents consume bundles with the same utility in states of nature
that they do not distinguish.
In this model, which may be designated as an economy with uncertain delivery,
the trades which are allowed are extended from the classical structure of complete
contingent markets to include also contingent lists of goods. A list is a set of
bundles such that the market has the obligation to deliver one of the bundles
speciﬁed in the list. Equivalently, it is a set of bundles such that the agent has
the right to receive one of the bundles speciﬁed in the list. This formulation
covers ﬁnancial derivatives known as options.
For example, consider that East Timor has 10 units of oil and 1 unit of medicines.
With the ﬁrst coordinate representing oil and the second representing medicines:
eE = (10,1). If some trade is made giving Australia an option on East Timor to
get 8 units of oil in exchange for 4 units of medicines, then, in our formulation,
East Timor will have the list lxE = [(10,1)∨(2,5)]. This means that (depending
on the preferences of Australia) East Timor will end up with 10 units of oil and
1 unit of medicines, or with 2 units of oil and 5 units of medicines.
We expand the market structure, but do not expect markets for each of the lists
to clear. On the contrary, a particular list may only be traded by one of the
agents. For example, let the initial endowments of East Timor and Australia be
3eE = (10,1) and eA = (42,64). East Timor can get the list lxE = [(10,1)∨(2,5)]
with Australia getting the list lxA = [(50,60) ∨ (250,700)]. The trade of 8 units
of oil in exchange for 4 units of medicines leads to xE = (2,5) and xA = (50,60),
which is a feasible allocation that satisﬁes the requirements set by the lists. The
lists are feasible if there is some combination of alternatives that constitutes a
feasible allocation.
Each agent can get a diﬀerent list, so to talk about clearing the market for a list is
meaningless. Market clearing should be veriﬁed in the markets for the primitive
commodities: oil and medicines. The derivatives markets are not expected to
clear.
A possible interpretation of this model is the following. Each agent deals with
a broker, who oﬀers contingent lists in exchange for the agent’s endowments.
Among themselves, the brokers trade state-contingent commodities (primitives).
That is, internally, the market works as an Arrow-Debreu economy only with the
primitive commodities. To guarantee feasibility of the allocation in terms of lists,
we restrict brokers to the sale of lists that they can deliver with 100% probability,
and assume that they make no proﬁts. These assumptions imply that the price
charged for a list is the price (in the internal market) of the cheapest bundle
which satisﬁes the requirements of the list.
A representative oﬀering lx = [(a∨b∨c),(a∨b∨c),(d∨e)] has diﬀerent possibilities
of guaranteeing delivery of this list. One is to buy (in the internal markets for
primitives) the state-contingent bundle (a,b,d), another is to buy (c,c,e), or
(a,c,e), etc. In any case, the ﬁrst and second coordinates are a, b or c, and
the third is d or e. The representative will choose to buy the cheapest of the
bundles that guarantees delivery of lx. This cheapest bundle has two fundamental
characteristics: its price is the price of the list; and this is actually the bundle
which will be delivered.
In this way, the prices of lists are uniquely determined by the prices of the
4contingent commodities in the internal market. Selection of bundles to be de-
livered is also determined internally - the bundle that is the cheapest is also the
one that is delivered. In sum, the internal market mechanism is responsible for
price-setting and for the selection of the bundles to be delivered to each agent in
each state of nature, among the possibilities speciﬁed in the lists.
In the previous paper, we have shown that allowing this kind of trades leads to
welfare improvements in the sense of Pareto. In that paper we assumed that
agents were extremely prudent in their assessment of the value of lists: agents
expected the worst possible bundle (in terms of utility) to be delivered. Now we
seek to study the case in which agents are not extremely pessimistic. Facing a list,
and observing prices, agents construct subjective expectations on the probabilities
of receiving each of the diﬀerent bundles in the list.
The main result in this paper is the existence of equilibrium independently of the
expectations of the agents, in general conditions. We remark that in this model
the preferences of the agents may also be a function of prices.
It makes some sense that these subjective expectations also depend on prices.4
Price constitutes an indication of the economic diﬃculty to deliver the good.
Having the right to receive a car or a bicycle, an agent should expect to receive
a bicycle, which is a cheaper good.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, the model is presented; section 3
discusses preferences and makes some assumptions on expectations; and in section
4 existence of equilibrium is established.
4This dependence has been recognized before by Veblen (1899) and Pollak (1977). With price
dependent preferences, it is known that equilibrium exists (Arrow and Hahn, 1971). Economies
with price-dependent preferences were recently studied by Balasko (2003).
52 The economy with uncertain delivery
An economy with uncertain delivery is similar to a diﬀerential information
economy in which agents are allowed to select consumption lists instead of bundles.
Remember that a list is a set of bundles such that the market is obliged to deliver
one of the bundles in the list. Another interpretation is that an agent is allowed
to buy diﬀerent bundles for delivery in states of nature that she does not distin-
guish, but has to accept any of the bundles that corresponds to a state that she
is unable to distinguish from the actual state of nature.
We restrict our analysis to a ﬁnite set of possible states of nature: Ω =
{ω1,ω2,...,ωΩ}. Agents have private information that allows them to distinguish
between some of these states, represented by a partition of Ω, Pi, such that agent
i is able to distinguish states that belong to diﬀerent sets of the partition. The
set of states that agent i does not distinguish from ωs is denoted by Pi(ωs).
We also restrict the number of commodities in the economy to be ﬁnite. The
consumption of agent i in the state of nature ωs, can thus be written as a vector
xs
i ∈ IRl
+. Since the number of contingent goods is also ﬁnite, the complete
contingent consumption of agent i can be written as a vector xi ∈ IRΩl
+ . With
lists having K elements, we can write a list that speciﬁes the alternative bundles
that agent i may receive in state ωs as a vector lxs
i ∈ IRKl
+ . Similarly, a complete
vector of contingent lists can be written as lxi ∈ IRΩKl
+ . We also denote by lxsk
the kth alternative in the list lxs, which, in turn, speciﬁes the bundles that the
market may deliver in state ωs.
The economy extends over two time periods. In the ﬁrst, the agents (i = 1,...,n)




i ), specifying the bundles that the market may deliver in
each state of nature. This vector is constant across states that the agents can-
not distinguish, that is, if ωt ∈ Pi(ωs), then lxt
i = lxs
i. This is the common
measurability restriction of Radner (1968) and Yannelis (1991). In the second
6period, agents receive (and consume) one of the bundles in the list that corre-
sponds to the state of nature that occurs. For example, suppose that the actual
state of nature is ωs. In this case, agent i has the right to receive one of the
bundles lxsk
i in the list lxs
i.
For concreteness, let the set of possible states of nature be Ω = {ω1,ω2,ω3},
the private information of agent i be Pi = {{ω1,ω2},{ω3}}, and the measurable




In the second period, if the state of nature is ω1 or ω2, agent i receives one of the
bundles a, b or c; while if it is ω3 that occurs, then the agent receives d or e.
The economy with uncertain delivery is deﬁned by E ≡ (ei,ui,Pi,qi,Ei)n
i=1, where,
for each agent i:
- A partition of Ω, Pi, represents private information. The set of states of
nature that agent i does not distinguish from ωs is denoted by Pi(ωs).
- Subjective probabilities are attributed to the diﬀerent possible states of
nature. To each state ωs ∈ Ω, corresponds a the subjective probability
qs




- Preferences are represented by Von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) utility
functions, us
i : IRΩl
+ → IR, assumed to be continuous, weakly monotone and
concave.
- For each state of nature, ωs ∈ Ω, a continuous subjective expectations
function, Es
i(lxi,p) : LX × ∆Ωl
+ → ∆K
+, gives the subjective probabilities
of delivery of each of the bundles lxsk
i ∈ lxs
i.
- The initial endowments are constant across undistinguished states, and
strictly positive: ei(ωs)  0 for all ωs ∈ Ω.
It is clear that a bundle of primitives, x, allows a broker to oﬀer various lists.
Examples of deliverable lists are (x∨y) and (0.5x∨z), but certainly not (2x∨x+y).
7Having x, the broker can keep the contract for the delivery of (x∨y) (by delivering
x), and also the contract for the delivery of (0.5x ∨ z) (by delivering 0.5x). But
the broker cannot possibly deliver 2x nor x + b, which are strictly greater than
the bundle x.
Precisely, with the physical feasibility restriction being satisﬁed, a bundle x =
(x1,x2,...,xΩ) ∈ IRΩl allows the delivery of the following set of lists:
LX(x) = {lx = (lx
1,...,lx





Given a list, lx, and prices p, agents have prior beliefs on the probability of
delivery of each of the bundles in the list. These are assumed to depend continu-
ously on prices. A further technical assumption is that given a list with an inﬁnite
number of possible bundles for delivery, an agent only attributes strictly positive
probabilities of delivery to a maximum of K bundles, and is indiﬀerent between
the original list and the truncated one, which has the relevant K elements. In
this setting, the space of relevant lists can be reduced to LX = IRΩKl
+ . Note that
a list with less than K alternatives can still be represented in IRΩKl
+ by completing
the remaining coordinates with repetitions of the alternatives already included.
A vector of primitive assets, x ∈ IRΩl
+ , allows a broker to oﬀer a set of lists,
LX(x) = LX1(x1)×LX2(x2)×...×LXΩ(xΩ). Note that the possible alternatives
for delivery in state ωs only depend on the primitive assets deliverable in this state,
that is, on xs. With lists having a maximum of K alternatives, in state ωs, the
contingent list lxs




with [0,xs] denoting the set of bundles ys such that ys ≤ xs. For example,
with a single state of nature and a single commodity: x = 1 implies LX(x) =
{[0,1]×IR+}∪{IR+×[0,1]}. Observe that the correspondence LX, from bundles
to allowed lists is continuous.
The price that is charged to the agents for the list lx (a vector of “derivatives”)
is assumed to be equal to the price of the bundle x (a vector of “primitives”) that
8the broker buys in the internal market to guarantee delivery of lx. This bundle x
is the cheapest among those that allow the broker to comply with the contract.
Price functions can thus be deﬁned over the vectors of state-contingent bundles
(primitives), and not over lists (derivatives). We normalize the price functions to

















The “budget set” can also deﬁned over the vectors of state-contingent bundles.




















The preferences of the agents are given by an expected utility function. Recall
that we denoting the kth element of a list that is delivered when a state ωs occurs
by lxsk, and the corresponding subjective probability by Esk
i . With this notation,














The hypothesis of continuity of the expectation functions and of the state-
dependent utility functions imply that this subjective expected utility function is
also continuous.
It is useful to deﬁne an indirect expected utility function, Vi(xi,p), as the max-
imum expected utility that a broker with a bundle xi can promise to deliver to
agent i. That is, as the expected utility of the list, lxi, that can be oﬀered with
a bundle xi and that is such that the agent prefers none of the other lists which




Since any list can be truncated to one of K elements, the maximum is attainable
in the compact LX(xi) ∩ IRΩKl
+ , so Berge’s Maximum Theorem can be applied.
9A triple (p∗,x∗,lx∗) is a competitive equilibrium with subjective expectations if p∗
is a price system and x∗ = (x∗
1,...,x∗
n) is a feasible allocation such that, for every i,
x∗
i ∈ IRΩl
+ maximizes indirect expected utility, Vi(x∗
i,p∗), on Bi(p∗,ei). The triple
is completed by a vector lx∗ = (lx∗
1,...,lx∗
n) such that Ui(lx∗
i,p∗) = Vi(x∗
i,p∗).
This means that the vector x∗
i is sold to the agent as the list lx∗
i, and that (given
prices p∗) no list that is preferred by the agent can be delivered using resources
x0
i such that p∗ · x0
i ≤ p∗ · x∗
i.
103 Preferences over lists and resources
The utility attributed to a list depends on the list itself, but also on prices. Recall
that the subjective expectations functions are assumed to be continuous. In the
restricted space of lists with K bundles, these functions are deﬁned as follows:
E
s





To a pair composed by a list with K elements, lxi ∈ LXK, and a price vector
p ∈ ∆Ωl
+ , the subjective expectations function of agent i for state ωs, denoted
Es
i(lxi,p), gives the subjective probability beliefs (a vector in ∆K
+) of receiving
each of the elements of the list, if the state of nature that occurs is ωs. Each








After receiving information Pi(ωs), agent i knows that the state of nature belongs
to this set. In this interim stage, the market is sure of being obliged to deliver
one of the bundles of the list lxs
i. The correspondent coordinate from the vector
of contingent commodities, xs
i, is what the market will deliver, but the agent does
not know that.
The agent only sees the list lxs
i, and has subjective expectations regarding the
probabilities of delivery of the diﬀerent elements of the list. Remember that these
beliefs are assumed to vary continuously with prices and that subjective expected
















In some sense, these preferences are not convex. To see this, consider two
commodities and linear utility: u(x,y) = x+y. Thus, we have u(1,0) = u(0,1) =
1 and u(a,0) = u(0,a) = a. Let also a > 1. How much is u((1,0) ∨ (0,a))? And
u((0,1) ∨ (a,0))? Both lists give an ex post utility of either 1 or a. Suppose that
11preferences are not prudent5, that is, that agents look beyond the worst outcome:
u((1,0) ∨ (0,a)) > 1 and u((0,1) ∨ (a,0)) > 1. Nevertheless, a realistic agent





(1/2,1/2)∨(a/2,a/2). Observe that the market will not deliver (a/2,a/2) when
there is a possibility of delivering (1/2,1/2) << (a/2,a/2). Therefore, the agent
should consider u((1/2,1/2) ∨ (a/2,a/2)) = u((1/2,1/2) = 1. Since the average
allocation has an utility of 1, lower than the utility of the extremes, convexity is
violated.
How do we get around this problem?
We make an assumption that may be interpreted as meaning that the agents take
probabilities of delivery as given, neglecting the impact of their choices. This
assumption, which we make precise in this section, implies that if the bundle
x ∈ IRΩl
+ allows the oﬀer of a list lx, and y ∈ IRΩl
+ allows the oﬀer of a list ly, then,
any convex combination z = λx+(1−λ)y, with λ ∈ [0,1], allows the oﬀer of a list
lz such that U(lz,p) ≥ min{U(lx,p),U(ly,p)}. Precisely, given z = λx+(1−λ)y:
lx ∈ LX(x)∧ly ∈ LX(y) ⇒ ∃lz ∈ LX(z) : U(lz,p) ≥ min{U(lx,p),U(ly,p)}.
Given prices p, consider the lists that can be oﬀered using resources x and y, and
let the two following, lx and ly, be among the optimal for the agent:
lx = (lx1,...,lxΩ) = [(lx11 ∨ lx12 ∨ ... ∨ lx1K),...,(lxΩ1 ∨ lxΩ2 ∨ ... ∨ lxΩK)];
ly = (ly1,...,lyΩ) = [(ly11 ∨ ly12 ∨ ... ∨ ly1K),...,(lyΩ1 ∨ lyΩ2 ∨ ... ∨ lyΩK)].
Precisely (we omit subscripts i for clearness):






















Observe that λx allows the oﬀer of the list:
5See Correia-da-Silva and Herv´ es-Beloso (2005).
12λlx = (λlx1,...,λlxΩ) = [(λlx11 ∨ ... ∨ λlx1K),...,(λlxΩ1 ∨ ... ∨ λlxΩK)].
And, similarly, that (1 − λ)y allows the oﬀer of (1 − λ)ly:
(1 − λ)ly = [(1 − λ)ly1,...,(1 − λ)lyΩ)].
As a result, a convex combination of the resources, z = λx + (1 − λ)y, allows
delivery of a sort of convex combination of the two lists, lz. This list is deﬁned,





j[λlxsi + (1 − λ)lysj].
Denote the expected probability of lxsi being selected from the list lxs by rsi
x ,
that of lysj being selected from list lys by rsj
y , and that of [λlxi+(1−λ)lyj] being
selected from lzs by rsij
z .
By showing that the list lz = (lz1,...,lzΩ) is not worse than lx and ly, we will
arrive a convexity of preferences in a sense that is crucial to establish existence of
equilibrium. For it, we assume that agents assume their inﬂuences on the delivery
choices of the market (among the elements of the list) to be negligible. Precisely,



















































z u(λlxsi + (1 − λ)u(lysj)) =
13= Us(lz,p).
Thus, for given prices, preferences over resources are convex. The indirect utility
function is quasi-concave and the optimal demand correspondence (deﬁned over
primitives) is convex-valued:
V (λx + (1 − λ)y,p) ≥ min{V (x,p),V (y,p)}.
144 Existence of equilibrium
Assume for now that the lists proposed to the agents, besides having a maximum
of K alternatives, must also have bounded coordinates, that is, LXKT = [0,T]ΩKl
and XT = [0,T]Ωl. We already know that the subjective expected utility function,
U(lxi,p), is continuous. Thus, it follows that, in this “compact” domain, the
indirect utility, Vi(xi,p) = max
lxi∈LXKT(xi)
Ui(lxi,p), is well deﬁned (the maximum
always exists).
Furthermore, the correspondence from bundles to sets of lists,
LX(x), is continuous with non-empty compact values. Applying
Berge’s Maximum Theorem, we ﬁnd that the indirect utility function,
Vi(xi,p) = max
lxi∈LXKT(xi)
Ui(lxi,p), is continuous, and that the argmax correspon-
dence is upper hemicontinuous.
Recall that in the previous section the indirect utility function, Vi(xi,p), has been
shown to be quasi-concave in the ﬁrst variable. Thus, to establish existence of
equilibrium (in the internal market) we have the classical conditions, except for
the fact that preferences also depend on prices. We assume that this dependence
is continuous for the subjective utility function to be continuous, thus allow-
ing application of Berge’s Maximum Theorem. As usually, the auctioneer takes
preferences as given, and sets prices that maximize the value of excess demand,
which is a linear function.
Proof.
Consider a correspondence, ψ, which assigns to given prices, p, a vector of
bundles, x0
i ∈ XT, maximizers of Vi(xi,p), and to the total demand,
P
i xi, the






(x0,p0) ∈ ψ(x,p) ⇔
i) x
0







The argument is well known. Applying Berge’s Maximum Theorem, we ﬁnd
that this correspondence is upper semicontinuous with respect to every xi and p.
It also has non-empty, closed and convex values (from quasi-concaveness of Vi).
The consumption and price spaces, XT and ∆, are compact, therefore existence
of equilibrium can be established using the Theorem of Kakutani.
QED
A diﬃculty that appears when extending the proof to LX = IRKΩl
+ and X = IRΩl
+ ,
is to guarantee existence of Vi(xi,p) = max
lxi∈LX(xi)
Ui(lxi,p).
A straightforward way contour this diﬃculty is to grant the agents with some
information about the total resources in the economy. Using this information,
they would regard the alternatives that imply delivery of greater quantities than
those that exist in the whole economy as impossible, that is:
E
sk







Note that a list can be interpreted as a bundle together with real options of the
market on the agent. A list a∨b∨c can be seen as the bundle a together with two
options given to the market: to trade a for b, and to trade a for c. So the agent
may end up consuming a, b or c, depending on the preferences of the market.
Going back to our problem, a restriction to lxs
i is that one of the alternatives lxsk
i
cannot exceed xs
i. Suppose that it is actually equal to xs
i. It may be seen, thus,
as the combination between xs
i and a maximum of K real options of the market
to trade it for each of the lxsk
i . Notice that it is the market that has the option,
not the agent.
6The function lxskl represents the quantity of commodity l in the alternative bundle k to be
delivered in state ωs, and the function Esk
i (lx,p) is the kth coordinate of Es
i (lx,p), that is, the
subjective probability of the market selecting alternative k for delivery in state ωs.
16Under this assumption on expectations, the argument for existence of equilibrium
in the compact economy extends to LX = IRKΩl
+ and X = IRΩl
+ . It is enough to
work with ¯ LX = [0,
P
i ei]K ⊂ IRKΩl
+ and ¯ X = [0,
P
i ei] ⊂ IRΩl
+ .
The existence of equilibrium result is relative to the internal market, that is, to
(p∗,x∗). To ﬁnd the lists that are oﬀered to the agents in order to complete the
triple of equilibrium (p∗,x∗,lx∗) simply choose lists lx∗
i which maximize utility
Ui(lx∗
i,p∗) among those that can be oﬀered through resources x∗
i. Again recurring
to Berge’s Maximum Theorem, we know that these argmax exist.
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